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FIDUCIARY POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
CARL ZOLLMANN*U NDER the National banking act as originally enacted national
banks were not given and could not acquire any power to act as
fiduciaries. In consequence they found themselves seriously handi-
capped in their competition with state institutions. They were not able
on the death of their customers to retain the balances standing in their
names and saw this business going to rival trust companies or even state
banks authorized to conduct a trust departinent. In addition, they were
unable to acquire new business naturally growing out of their daily
transactions if such business happened to be of a trust nature.
To obviate this difficulty many of the more powerful national banks
associated with themselves trust companies created under the laws
of their particular state and subject to its supervision but controlled
either by the national bank as such or by its stockholders, or through
some other legal device. Such a course however was open only to the
more powerful banks and led to considerable perplexity in the adjust-
ment of the rights of the two institutions which usually occupied the
same quarters or adjoining ,buildings or buildings not far apart, and
whose very names frequently indicated their close association. Such
arrangements continue to the present day particularly in the larger
cities.
This left the smaller national banks in a bad way so far as this phase
of their competition with the state banks was concerned. A remedy
was sought but it was felt that direct power should not be given to them
in terms to conduct a trust business. On the other hand it was also
felt that they should under proper supervision be alloN;ed this privilege.
The passage of the Federal Reserve Act in -1913 and the appointment
of the Federal Reserve Board under it furnished both the occasion
for this reform and the proper body to undertake the task of super-
vision. -
In consequence Section i i k of the Federal Reserve Act as originally
enacted authorized and empowered the Federal Reserve Board "to grant
by special permit, to national banks applying therefor, when not in con-
travention of state or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, ad-
ministrator, or registrar of stocks and bonds under such rules and
regulatlbn's as the said board may prescribe." This provision was
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looked upon by many as a further step by Congress to extend its legis-
lation into matters of purely local and state concern and naturally led
to reactions. Accordingly the New Hampshire legislature in 1915
passed a statute disqualifying all banks to act as executors, adminis-
trators or guardians. This statute in terms applied to national banks,
and was upheld by the state courts saying, "The act of Congress was
not an attempt to invest probate courts with a power of appointment
they did not possess before, but it was an authorization to national banks
to accept appointments when the probate courts were authorized to make
them."' The question of the constitutionality of section ii k of the
Reserve Act was raised in Illinois in 1915 independently of any legis-
lative action. The court reasoned that certain powers of government
belong exclusively to the state as distinguished from the Federal Gov-
ernment. The regulation of property within the state, the modes of
acquiring and transferring it, and the rules of descent and distribution
are exclusively the concern of the states. Trustees, executors and ad-
ministrators are the instrumentalities through which estates are settled
and transfers of property effected and the property itself protected and
guarded. The court further argued that trust companies are very dif-
ferent from banking corporations. Though some states allow both
functions to be exercised by the same corporation they usually are kept
as separate departments. In some states banks do not act as trust com-
panies and in others trust companies have no banking powers. National
banks without fiduciary powers have efficiently served the government
purposes for which they were primarily created. Since no showing was
made that added powers are now necessary to the further success of the
national banks the court concluded that the fiduciary section of the
Federal Reserve Act is null and void and in contravention of state or
local laws.2 The same question was raised in Michigan in 1916 in a
proceeding in the nature of quo warranto brought on behalf of a trust
company by the. Attorney General in the Supreme Court to enjoin a
national bank from acting as a fiduciary. One judge placed his decision
on the ground that the federal provision was in contravention of exist-
ing state laws and argued that no specific prohibitory law need be
pointed out but that it is sufficient that the state legislature in the enact-
ment of the state trust, deposit and security statutes conferring certain
powers on trust companies has by unavoidable inference excluded all
'Appeal of Woodbury (N.H.) 96 Atl. 299, 301.
2People v. Brady, 271 Ill. ioo, iio N.E. 864.
In State ex rel v. Russell, 283 Ill. 520, ii9 N.E. 617, People v. Brady is left
undisturbed on the ground that it is the decision of the case though the court
concedes that if the Brady case had been appealed to the United States Supreme
Court it would have been reversed.
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that this legislation is so particular and voluminous and the legislative
other corporations within the state from the exercise of such powers and
purpose so apparent that a conflict with the federal reserve act must
necessarily result. With this conclusion the majority of the court dis-
agreed and held expressly that since corporations were authorized to
perform these functions the fact that national banks are federal cor-
porations does not because of the difference of the administrativq rules
which govern them as distinguished from the state corporations dis-
qualify them or make their act to be in contravention o-f state laws.
However, the result reached by the majority was the same for the court
decided that the federal reserve act directly invaded the sovereignty of
the state and so far as this provision is concerned was null and void
independently of what particular statutes might be on the Michigan
statute books.3
This decision naturally made a case for the United States Supreme
Court. It was so promptly appealed that it was argued less than six
months after it was decided. The United States Supreme Court on
June II, 1916, reversed the case on the ground among others that it does
not follow that because Congress recoguized that a particular function
of a national bank was subject to be regulated by the state law Congress
was without power to confer such power and that the purpose of the
Reserve Act was merely to co-ordinate such fucntions with the reason-
able and non-discriminating provisions of such state laws as regulate
their exercise when stdte corporations are concerned to the end that
harmony and the concordant exercise of the national and state power
might result.4
This, however, was not the extent of the federal decision. Other
contentions were raised and decided. Not much time was taken
up with the contention that the section was void because it conferred
legislative power on the Reserve Board. The court merely said that this
contention was so plainly adversely disposed of by many previous ad-
judications that it was unnecessary to do more than merely refer to
them. However, the right of the Attorney General to resort to the
state court was challenged on the ground that the functions thus
bestowed are inherently federal in character, are enjoyed by a federal
corporation and are susceptible of being tested only in the federal courts.
The court disposed of this contention by referring to the fact that such
powers are conferred only "when not in contravention of state or local
law" and held that Congress by these words expressly or at least im-
pliedly authorized the state courts to consider and pass upon the ques-
'Fellows v. First National Bank, 192 Mich. 640, 159 N.W. 335.
'First WNat. Bank of Bay City v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co. 37 S.Ct.
734, 244 U.S. 416, 61 L.Ed. 1233.
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tion whether a particular power was or was not in contravention of the
state law.5
The language of the Supreme Court seemed to be susceptible of an
interpretation that these permits might be granted in any case in which
the State laws permit competing banks to exercise such powers. The
question was submitted to the Attorney General who stated it as his
opinion that while Congress is fully empowered to authorize the board
to grant permits in such cases, it had not as yet done so5 0 a This threw
the controversy back into Congress. The Federal Reserve Board ac-
cordingly on September 26, 1918, obtained an amendment to the Federal
Reserve Act by which the powers which may be bestowed by the Board
on a national bank were expanded to include in addition to those of
trustees, executors, administrators and registrars of stocks and bonds
those relating to guardians of estates, assignees, receivers, committees
of estates of lunatics "and any fiduciary capacity in which State banks
trust companies, or other corporations which come into competition with
national banks are permitted to act under the laws of the state in which
the national bank is located."
The important provision in this connection, however, was the fol-
lowing: "Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the
exercise of any or all of the foregoing powers by State banks, trust
companies, or other corporations which compete with national banks,
the granting to and the exercise of such powers by national banks shall
not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within the
meaning of this act."' That this amendment must raise many intricate
questions of law and policy' was a foregone conclusion. The outstand-
ing legal question of course was whether Congress had the power to
establish the conclusive presumption that where there was competition
with state banks or trust companies the granting of fiduciary powers to
national banks was not in contravention to the particular state law. On
this question the Rhode Island court indeed in 1922 took the strong
position that it would not "admit the power of Congress to control this
court in the construction of the state laws of Rhode Island." This
case was not appealed to the United States Supreme Court because the
decision was based primarily on the ground that the State treasurer
See In re Turner's Estate-Pa.-I2o AtI. 701, 702, IO Fed. Res. Bd. Rep.
3o4. The court following the United States Supreme Court decision says that
it is clearly left to the state courts to ascertain whether, in any given case, the
exercise of the powers granted are in contravention of state or local laws.
S. 4 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 26.
'See 5 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 262.
'6 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 57.
'Aquineck Nat. Bank v. Jennings (R.I.) 117 Atl. 743, 746.
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could not be compelled by mandamus to accept a tender of bonds from
a national bank as security for the performance of its fiduciary func-
tions. 9 A contrary view was taken by the courts of Pennsylvania.
Though an isolated" District court refused to recognize or approve
national banks as fiduciaries, 10 Pennsylvania Superior Court held in
1922 that the only question on which the right to grant permits to
national banks was whether the state permitted such competing cor-
porations to act in that capacity and that if it did the national banks
must be permitted to enjoy fiduciary powers and that the effect of the
amendment to the federal reserve act is to permit national- banks to act
in fiduciary caliacities whenever the laws of such state authorized or
permitted the exercise of any or all such powers by state banks or
other, corporations competing with the national banks. The court said
that Congress is the sole judge of the means appropriate to the end to
be accomplished by the exercise of this additional power conferred on'
national banks. It expressly found that the act of Congress and the
State laws are not alike, but that their differences do not establish in
the light of the congressional definition of the terms that the Federal
Statute is in contravention of the state law. 1 Accordingly, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in affirming this decision argued that Congress
with full knowledge of the different laws affecting trust companies in
the various states gave the Federal Reserve Board power to prescribe
regulations for the government of the national banks and that regu-
lations thus 'established are paramount to state rules and the latter must
yield when a conflict arises. When Congress in 1918 defined what was
to be considered as in contravention of state laws reference was had to
the right itself not to the rules governing the exercise of such right.
Concede the existence of the right in the state banks and we have the
same right bestowed on the national-banks. Had Congress intended to
have the national banks governed by state laws in the exercise of the
rights given it would- have said so. As it is it must be assumed that
Congress was satisfied with the rules already prescribed by the Federal
Reserve Board. If these rules happen to conflict with state regulations
on the subject the latter must yield because the right being conceded the
power to regulate the exercise of the right follows as a necessary inci-
dent.' 2 The same result was arrived at as early as 1919 in New York,'3
ii Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 28.
"
0 lit the matter of the National Bk. of Germantown, 30 Pa. Dist. Rep. 003.
"
1Estate of Turner 8o Pa. Super. Ct. 88, 9 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 277 affirmed, 12o
AtI. 701, io Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 304. .
"In re Turner's Estate 277 Pa. i1O, 12o AtI. 701, 703, 704, io Fed. Res. Bd.
Rep. 304.
"In re Mollneaux 179 N.Y. Supp. go.
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and in 1920 in Connecticut,1 4 Wisconsin'- and the federal district court
of the western district of Missouri.
16
The question was finally squarely raised in Missouri and decided in
such a manner that an appeal to the United States Supreme Court would
result in a conclusive decision. In an action of mandamus to compel
a probate judge to appoint a national bank as executor the Missouri
court correctly construed the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States rendered in 1917 but reached the conclusion that the
Reserve Act as amended in 1918 was in conflict with the Missouri stat-
ute which in terms permitted its own banks and trust companies to
exercise fiduciary powers. The court said that both reason and author-
ity supported the view that the exercise of the fiduciary powers men-
tioned in the federal reserve act are in contravention of the law of
Missouri, the legislative policy and the express statutes.1" The case
was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and resulted in a
division of the court. Holmes J. writing the opinion of the majority
referred to the provision of the amendment of 1918 which raised the
conclusive presumption and said: "This says in a roundabout and polite
but unmistakable way that whatever may be the state law, national
banks having the permit of the Federal Reserve Board may act as ex-
ecutors if trust companies competing with them have that power. The
relator has the permit, competing trust companies can act as executors in
Missouri, the importance of the power to the sustaining of competition
in the banking business is so well known and has been explained so fully
heretofore that it does not need to be emphasized, and thus the naked
question presented is whether Congress had the power to do what it
tried to do." The actual decision was in the affirmative, the court say-
ing that the State cannot lay hold of its general control of administration
to deprive national banks of their power to compete with state insti-
tutions.' The effect of this decision is to establish conclusively the
right of national banks to exercise trust powers in any state whose laws
authorize or permit the exercise of similar powers by competing state
institutions. The decision is so conclusive that the Rhode Island court
though considering the dissenting opinion as eminently sound and con-
vincing and based upon the just relation which exists under the consti-
tution between the powers of Congress and those of the state authori-
ties in matters of local concern finally holds in deference to the decision
"Hamilton v. State 94 Conn. 648, iio At. 54.
'Estate of Stanchfield 171 Wis. 553.
"Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co. v. Enright 264 Fed. 236.
' State v. Duncan 302 Mo. 130, 257 S.W. 784.
"Burnes National Bank v. Duncan 265 U.S. 17, 44 S.Ct. 427.
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of the court that the national bank involved should not be ousted from
the further exercise of its fiduciary powers.19
The practical result of this very interesting legal development is that
the number of national banks which have obtained permits has in-
creased from year to' year. The number of such permits would doubt-
lessly be much greater than it is were it not for the fact that very
many of the stronger banks control a trust company to which they
transfer their trust business, which fact of course makes the establish-
ment of a trust department under a permit by the Federal Reserve
Board unnecessary. As it is, 125 applications were granted in 1916,20
and the total was brought to 481 in 1917.21 In i918 this total rose to
7o8 ;22 in i919 to i,o74,23 and on October 15, I92O, it was 1,387.24 At
the end of 1921 the list contained 1,547 banks,2 5 and in 1923 the number
was 1,819.2' Here the saturation point may have been reached, for the
Federal Reserve Board reports that on December 21, 1924, the number
was 1,802, seventeen banks less than the year before.2 7  This great
growth has gone hand in hand with the development of a more friendly
spirit on the part of the various state authorities and a gradual aban-
donment of opposition. Therefore the Federal Reserve Board in its
report for the year 1921 stated that the opposition by state authorities
had very largely disappeared; that in all but three or four states national
banks are permitted to exercise fiduciary powers on a basis of substantial
equality with state trust companies and that the amount of trust funds
thus held was estimated at $825,000,000. It is clear indeed that trust
departments bring new business into the national banks and enable them
to retain balances which upon the death of their customers would other-
wise be diverted to competing trust companies. In addition, national
banks in communities where there are no trust companies furnish,
through their trust department, a service which the community greatly
needs, though lack of acquaintanceship with trust companies is a handi-
cap under such circumstances.2
ii Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 237.
.3 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 2.
24 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep.
'5 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 72.
" 6 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 62.
248 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 85.
29 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 35.
io Fed. Res. Bd. Rep.
SiiFed. Res. Bd. Rep. 28.
'8 Fed. Res. Bd. Rep. 86.
